Abstract---Protection of critical infrastructures involves handling of incidents that may range from serious to quite harmless events. Such systems require means for surveillance that involves a type of sensor system that may identify entities that behave in an unusual way. However, this is not sufficient as means for determination of entities that seemingly are behaving in a normal way but whose activities somehow relate to the first category, must be determined. Means for the support of the operators must also be available by the surveillance system. In this work, an approach to a surveillance system with a Slow Intelligence systems controller for incident handling using a situation-based recommendations Handbook, is proposed and discussed.
INTRODUCTION
Critical infrastructures are to an increasing degree becoming the target for intruders with the intentions to either destroy such facilities or to take them over. For this reason, systems designed for the surveillance of such critical infrastructures have become necessary. An integrated part of such surveillance systems is the sensor system that may include multiple sensors of varying types, such as video cameras, IR-cameras and radars. The sensor systems are continuously collecting large amount of data that are analyzed by the surveillance system and made available to the operators. Collected data may be represented in various information structures. The generation of such extremely large data volumes will eventually lead to the determination of overwhelmingly large information quantities that must be handled and interpreted by the surveillance system to support its operators. Adequate handling of the incoming information by the operators is more or less impossible unless the information is organized and presented in a suitable way. The support for this should not only be carried out by the operational picture presentation system, the operator will also need recommendations on how to act under various circumstances as the situation that need to be handled may be quite complex and of unexpected nature. Important aspects here are, for example, relationships existing between entities within and around the facility and in which context the entities are acting and whether they could be determined as direct or indirect intruders. Operator support from the surveillance system is of great importance when dealing with serious incidents such as attacks from threatening intruders or antagonists. The approach taken here is to solve the problem based on an approach to Slow Intelligence [1] and the use of a situation-based recommendation handbook for crisis management [2] and the protection of critical infrastructures.
The main objective of the work discussed in this work concerns an approach to incident handling based upon Slow Intelligence systems (SIS) controller. Secondary to this, some details of a recommendations handbook to support the operator of the surveillance system will also be discussed together with the required information structures of the surveillance system. This paper is organized as follows. The architecture of the surveillance system is described in section II together with its process steps. In section III the Slow Intelligence system controller is introduced together with various computation cycles of the Slow Intelligence system controller. The situation-based recommendation handbook is discussed in section IV. Section V describes a short scenario and section VI gives an overview of the identified information structures, section VII presents related works and conclusions of the work are discussed in section VIII.
II.
SYSTEM ARCHTECTURE The architecture of the surveillance system can be seen in Fig. 1 and it is made up by three basic modules i.e. the sensor system, the Slow Intelligence system controller (SISC) and the visual operations control (VOC). The sensor system and its sensors will not be dealt with further in this work but it is expected to be able to detect and identify entities of all relevant types and on command track entities entering, residing inside or leaving the facility. This will require a system with a large number of sensor types where the capacity for collection, analyses and storage of these data will be necessary. Such sensor systems will be feasible in the near future as the technology for the development of such systems already exists. The SISC module supported by the sensor system will have the capability to identify entities engaged in hostile activities during the entire period of an incident. Another capability of great importance to the surveillance system is to allow for early detection of hostile entities. To be able to carry out all its requirements SISC also needs to have direct access to all information collected, generated or prestored in the databases of the surveillance system. The VOC contains, besides the operational picture, the command and control unit, the recommended actions viewer module and the situation-based recommendation handbook. Attached to the SISC module are three different databases, i.e. the Surveillance information database, the Terrain database and the Normal states database, which stores context information and other descriptions related to the normal state of the facility. The system can be in one of three event states, i.e. Normal, Deviation and Incident. Besides, there is also an alarm state with three different states, i.e. Inactive, Unverified and Verified. In the Normal state the surveillance system collects information that is used to determine whether the behavior of all appearing entities are normal. Once some type of deviation from the normal occurs, the Event status will be switched to Deviation and in some obvious cases directly to Incident. In the Deviation state one or more entities may be subject to further observations and an alarm is released, which will correspond to an unverified alarm that immediately must be verified either automatically by some sensors or manually by a guard. The alarm will be determined either as false or true. When false the system is switched back to Normal and when true is set to Incident. In the Incident state, the operator, the rest of the staff and other involved must be concerned with bringing the incident to its end. Once the incident is brought to its end the system is switched back to the Normal and the alarm state is set to Inactive. The various steps in these processes are in short described below. 
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III.
THE SIS CONTROLER SISC can be seen as an information hub of the Surveillance system as almost all information in the system flows through this module. Besides by coordinating the information flow of the system CISC also determines entity to entity and entity to context relations. A further aspect of concern is to determine which of the entities are related to any entity with the event state equal to Incident. To determine this is the main task of the Slow Intelligence process. In short, this means that any entity with an identified relationship to an entity determined as an intruder and part of the incident will be classified and handled as an intruder independently of whether this eventually is the case.
The Slow Intelligence process can be seen as a procedure where first all entities, including also their entity relations, that could be considered antagonist candidates are determined, i.e. whether they could be determined as antagonists that could be participating in an incident. In a second step some of the identified entities are eliminated as they are considered unlikely participants of the incident. This procedure can be described as follows in terms of a pseudo high level programming language. to entities in Incident-entity-set Extend Incident-entity-set with entities with relevant relations to entities in Incident-entity-set Extend Incident entity relations with the relations between relations in New-entities and the relation in Incident-entity-set set Event-status to Incident to all new entities in Incident-entity-set))
A. Computation Cycles of SIS Controller
The computational cycles of the SIS Controller described in terms of Slow Intelligence operators and operational cycles as can be seen below. The comments in the description are inserted to make the description more readable. Incident and Verified then control to Cycle2. Cycle2 -Cycle10: these cycles control the maintenance of the incident. Cycle11: the incident has terminated and condition is set to Normal and Inactive and control is switched to Cycle0.
C. Details of computation Cycle 2
A more detailed description of the process in Cycle 2 above can be described as: The formal specification of the computation cycles provides a concise way to describe the SIS controller and also offers the possibility to mathematically derive certain properties such as the termination or non-termination of the SIS controller.
IV. SITUATION-BASED RECOMMENDATIONS HANDBOOK
In this section an overview of the situation-based Recommendation Handbook will be presented.
A. Organization of the Handbook
The Situation-based Recommendation Handbook will be engaged in a number of activities, i.e. to respond to the information received from SISC by looking up recommendations in the Handbook aimed at supporting the operator in the occurred situation. The received information can be of any of the three following alternative types: A consequence of the above input to the Handbook is a set of recommended actions to be carried out by the operator. The Handbook will include instructions of type call the police or send out a guard to patrol the location. However, those types of instructions are basically determined by local authorities at the facilities and will for this reason not be dealt with further here. Of importance to the work is the organization of the Handbook and the means to access its entries. The Handbook is basically split into two parts where the first is concerned with unverified alarms and deviating behavior while the second part is entirely focusing on incidents. The two parts are called the Deviation part and the Incident part. The search criteria of the two parts can simply be expressed as follows:
-The search criteria of the Deviation part are the Entity, Event types and Behavior of entity.
-The search criteria of the Incident part are the Entity, Event types and Behavior of entity where  a single entity is in focus resulting in just a single look-up,  multiple entities are in focus resulting in one look up for each entity.
The first cases are rather trivial. The last concerns multiple entities that may relate to, e.g. a meeting which involves at least two entities that may or may not be of different types but nevertheless will need one look-up for each entity so that the operator can handle them both separately and together.
Besides, recommendations to make, for example, phone calls to specific persons or organizations the Handbook must also give recommendations that concern the context of the operational situation. If an antagonist is walking through a forest around the facility a sent out guard cannot follow that person by car. If the antagonist is expected to carry weapons other precautions must be recommended. The list of special recommendations may be made quite long and cannot be completed here but must be seen as a task determined by the security staff at each specific facility.
B. Events corresponding to possible incidents
In Table 1 a series of possible events that may cause an incident are described; the number of incidents in the list is not complete and include just a few examples for illustration purposes. If an entity during an incident is acting accordingly its event status will be set to Deviation or Incident. The processing of these events may occur either in Cycles 1, 2 or 6 in SIS controller. Besides occurring during an incident as in 2 or 6, each of these events may either be the cause of an incident or a deviation, i.e. when any of these events occur in Cycle 1. For Cycles 2 and 6 verification of the alarm is not necessary because the incident is already going on, i.e. the alarm state is already set to Verified. Of importance to the events described is that they correspond to capabilities of surveillance applications, see e.g. [3] , and carried out in conjunction with the sensor system and SISC.
V. A SCENARIO The scenario given here can in short be described as follows:
A As soon as the last report has come in the incident has been brought to its end and the state of the surveillance system will be set to Normal and Inactive. However, this last step may need to include some further activities as the antagonists may have carried out activities whose effects have not yet been discovered and that consequently may cause problems later on. It is consequently necessary to inspect the facility for such perhaps dangerous threats even after the incident has been terminated. This is an activity that must be carried out by the staff of the facility.
VI. INFORMATION DESCRIPTION
In this section information structures that need to be used by the surveillance system are described.
A. Event related information
The purpose of event related information is to serve two capabilities of the surveillance system, i.e. to -find relevant entries to the Handbook -keep the operational picture updated at a current state.
That is, more or less the same information used to look up entries in the Handbook is also used to keep the operational picture updated. Consequently, Event dependent information used in these two activities corresponds to information acquired by means of the sensor system and in conjunction with the Slow Intelligence system controller that continuously is surveilling the facility and analyzing the acquired information; an activity that can be seen as the screening of a number of ongoing events that may correspond to various types of incidents. Incidents may consequently range from quite harmless behavior of different entities and up to really serious events carried out by terrorists. Furthermore, event related information can also be determined in part from historic events where the underlying data are captured over long periods in time essentially to allow statistical determination of what is a deviation from normal. Examples of such information could be tracks of observed objects that compared to historic data shows that the entity deviate from what can be considered normal. Other information that may be needed to improve the knowledge of an observed object and its general behavior could be the determination of relations to other entities. This information may be used to find new and relevant entries in the Handbook.
The information that needs to be collected by the sensor system and eventually stored belongs to classes that can be expressed as follows including also possible but not entirely complete value sets. 
B. Acquired and complementary information
Acquired information in this context means information captured by the sensor system that relates to detected entities and their status and properties. That is, information originating from sensor data that have been analyzed, often fused and eventually transferred into SISC for further analyses. Besides this, there is also a need for stationary information such as geographical information, which here is called complementary information and relates in most cases to the context of the facility and where the detected entities may reside from time to time. To thoroughly describe the context in which an entity resides and its status at a specific time during an ongoing event both acquired and complementary information is required. This can be described in terms of two information sets (relations) where some of the information appears in both sets basically for identification. The relations are approximately described as follows: The first relation, Status information, describes the status of an event at a specific point in time (Time of event) and its location; further information concerns the actual event type that is normal, a deviation or an incident. Data are gathered periodically for every observed entity within the area covered by the sensor system. Altogether, for every observed entity a track of every observed entity can be determined although it seems more economical to just track entities with the event status Deviation or Incident. Events that are classified as normal will be analyzed for determination of whether the general behavior of the entity is normal; all this will obviously require analyses of massively large data sets. For normal events no alarm is activated, that is the alarm status is set to Inactive and for these events the Handbook is not consulted. However, for all observations the Operational picture is updated to give the operator a presentation of the current situation at the facility. If the event is classified as a deviation by the system the Handbook must be consulted, and the operator may be instructed to verify the alarm to determine whether the event is to be classified as an incident. In case of an incident the operator must bring the incident to an end by means of the recommendations from the Handbook and the views of the operational picture.
C. The event situation
The event situation concerns the status both of observed events and the current alarm status. The relationship between Event status and Alarm status can be described as in Table 2 . To be observed here is also that events like threats must be considered as just deviations which can be seen as a situation with unverified alarms. This means that this alarm must be verified before an incident is at hand. Whenever an error occurs the operator must deal with a system failure; in other words it is a serious event that immediately must be handled by special domain experts or technicians but it is not an incident or deviation in the usual sense. 
D. Entity relations
All observed entities has relations to the environment in which they are acting but they also relate to the current event and leave tracks that especially during deviations and incidents must be acquired. As a consequence, the state description of any observed object may look like in Fig. 3 where both properties and contextual descriptive terms are included.
Of importance are not only the properties and the context of observed entities but also the relations between entities involved in deviations and incidents. Such relations can be direct as in the first relation in Fig. 4 , that is in the simple relation Entity-i meets Entity-j, In this relation no incident may be caused unless Entity-I is already classified as an intruder. In the second case an incident is determined because of the indirect relation as in the second example in the figure where Entity-i throws object-k and Entity-j picks up Object-k, where an entity throws an object, which will cause an incident, and then the indirect relation is established when the second entity picks up the thrown object. Which causes the second and indirect relation to be determined as Entity-j is considered part of the incident as well. Obviously, such entities, although they are classified as normal, appear to have relations to entities determined as incident related because throwing an object will automatically cause a verified alarm leading to an incident. Consequently, entities that appear to have any kind of relation to an entity involved in an incident must be seen as part of the incident i.e. their Event status must be switched from Normal to Incident and the crisis management staff must start acting accordingly. This means that the Handbook tells the operator to focus on the new incident related entity as well, which also is indicated in the operational picture that will show its status as Incident. 
VII. RELATED WORKS
Relations to other work in this context concerns several different aspects. Basically, they are concerned with Slow Intelligence, various approaches to recommendations systems but also to surveillance systems for protection of critical infrastructures. Of importance to note is also that this is the first attempt on the design of security and surveillance systems using Slow Intelligence for determination of entities involved in incidents at critical infrastructure facilities.
The Slow Intelligence approach was first proposed by Shi-Kuo Chang [1] . The visual specification of component-based Slow Intelligence Systems is described in [4] . This work introduces the visual description of super-components by Petri nets or other UML diagrams. It provides the foundation of the present work. Component-based Slow Intelligence Systems has been applied to many areas, including social influence analysis, topic and trend detection, high dimensional feature selection, image analysis, swimming activity recognition, and most recently pet care systems and energy control systems. In [5] the notion of an abstract machine for computation cycle was introduced. Our current approach is based upon it.
Related surveillance system for various approaches can be found in Goodall [6] where gathering of user requirements for a visualization system with capabilities for intrusion detection analysis is discussed. Shan, Wang, Li, and Chen [7] present a comprehensive design for decision support systems applied to emergency response. Hansson et al. [8] demonstrates the intensions to determine the general context for security systems as a foundation for user and system requirements. In [9] is a project called RESCUE discussed. In this work are a number of aspects that relates to this work discussed e.g. the focus on needs to assess situations for improved awareness. Pozzobon et al. [10] discuss primarily user requirements of surveillance systems with special emphasis on security in ports. A further relationship to this work concerns basically user requirements needed for determination of user oriented capabilities which plays an important role in systems development. However, this is more in focus to the work discussed in [3] .
Content based recommendation systems are generally based on descriptions of various items that may be of interest to a user with a particular profile see e.g. Pazzani and Billsus [11] . However, here the situation differs in that the recommendations can be seen as the result of observed events detected by the sensor system. Consequently, such recommendation systems will be event driven and the user has no other choice than to react to the events and given recommendations. Example of an application of this latter approach is proposed by Laliwala [12] in which an event-driven service-oriented agricultural recommendation system is proposed. Another similar example is given by Kim et al. [13] .
VIII. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS
In this work a surveillance system for protection of critical infrastructures is proposed. The main focus concerns capabilities to identify entities involved in abnormal behavior that eventually will cause alarms and turn the status of the system status into Incident. Further aspects that have been subject to attention here are also determination of incidental events and relations between entities involved in such incidents. The approach taken has been to carry out the determination of such information based on an approach to Slow Intelligence; the outcome is a SIS controller that will use various search criteria to a situation-based recommendation Handbook and the maintenance of an operational picture system. Complementary to this, the required information structures are also described and discussed. Finally, to demonstrate the capabilities discussed a simple scenario is carried out.
The approach taken in this work contributes to Slow Intelligence research in the sense the scenarios describe realistic computation cycles for the SIS controller. Hence, further research must focus on analysis of the computation cycles to determine the properties of SIS controllers such as termination conditions, existence of endless loops and so on.
